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Abstract
To reveal a policy mandate for financial stability, we introduce a frictional credit
market with a search and matching process into a standard New Keynesian model
with nominal rigidities in the goods market, and then investigate optimal policy
under financial frictions. We show that a second-order approximation of social wel-
fare includes terms for credit, in addition to terms for inflation and consumption, so
that any optimal policy must hold responsibility for financial and price stabilities.
We highlight this issue by considering several tools for monetary and macropru-
dential policy. We find that optimal monetary policy requires keeping the credit
market countercyclical against the real economy. Also, optimal macroprudential
policy, which poses constraints on supply and demand sides of credit, reduces ex-
cessive variations in lending and contributes to both financial and price stabilities.
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1 Introduction
The serious economic disruptions caused by financial crises reveal the critical roles played
by financial markets in the U.S. and the euro area. Acknowledging that the current policy
framework cannot fully mitigate nor avoid financial crises, policymakers have begun to
shed light on roles of financial markets on policy measures and vice versa. Two policy
measures are particularly focused on. The first is monetary policy, which aims to achieve,
in addition to traditional policy goals, stability of the financial system. The second is
macroprudential policy geared toward financial stability.
A growing number of publications stresses this new role of monetary policy for fi-
nancial stability. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) emphasizes that central
banks need to tighten monetary policy against accumulation of financial imbalances,
such as overheating of mortgage, stock, and bond markets, even when the real economy
seems to be stable in the near-term.1 Taylor (2008) argues that in the U.S., the Federal
Reserve Board appears to adjust the policy rate in response to credit spread to stimulate
the economy and maintain financial stability.2
The role of macroprudential policy, which is independent from monetary policy, in
sustaining financial stability is also highlighted in the literature. Borio (2011) empirically
shows the difference between financial and business cycles, and justifies the necessity of
the coexistence of macroprudential policy and other policies such as monetary policy.3
In practice, international organizations have begun to introduce macroprudential policy,
for example, the Basel III framework, as set forth by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS, 2010) and BCBS (2014). Such macroprudential policy includes,
among others, bank regulations that constrain supply of credit according to capital base
and/or economic situations.4
1See BIS (2009) and Caruana (2010).
2See also Christiano et al. (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Teranishi (2015), and Cu´rdia and
Woodford (2016). In particular, Gertler and Karadi (2011) build a model with a borrowing constraint
for banks as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and evaluate the quantitative easing policy.
3Drehmann, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2012) also show such empirical results.
4For example, in the Basel III, banks are required to meet a particular base level of capital ratio
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In this paper, we build a model with a banking sector and a frictional credit market
that is suitable for analyzing financial instability (or equivalently, inefficient fluctuations
in variables related to credit) and then analytically examine the optimal policy in such
an environment. As in Wasmer and Weil (2000) and Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson
(2003), we introduce financial market frictions by assuming search and matching process
in the credit market.5 Unlike these authors, however, we incorporate the credit market
by following the existing studies, in particular Ravenna and Walsh (2011), that embed
a frictional labor market into a standard New Keynesian model with nominal price
rigidities.6 Our approach enables expression of the welfare function in an intuitive form,
and allows tractable analyses of the optimal policy in a model that explicitly formulates
the supply side of credit. To elaborate, in our model, the aggregate loan volume is
determined by the formation and destruction of borrower-lender relationships, and the
loan interest rate varies with tightness of the credit market. These financial variables
are related to business cycles, and vice versa. Thus, we can analyze policies that directly
focus on the supply side, rather than the demand side of credit.
We begin our analysis of the model by, as in Woodford (2003), approximating the
representative household’s welfare in the second order. A novel finding is that the ap-
proximated welfare function includes, in addition to terms involving inflation and con-
sumption, terms related to credit such as credit market tightness, credit growth, and the
upper bound of loan volume. This result provides a theoretical justification for including
financial stability among the goals of optimal policy.
We then explore the properties of the optimal policy, starting from the monetary
policy that controls a deposit (policy) rate. We find that by taking a financial friction
into account, monetary policy should contribute to financial stability and thus perform
against risk assets, where this base is changed according to economic and financial conditions. Several
countries have also introduced different types of macroprudential policies, including total credit control
and capital control, as described in Lim et al. (2011) and Nier et al. (2011).
5Search and matching frictions are widely assumed in analyses of labor markets. See, e.g., Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) and Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005).
6Earlier studies that feature such a model include Walsh (2003), Thomas (2008), and Trigari (2009).
3
the macroprudential role. When equipped with this additional role, optimal monetary
policy must keep the credit market countercyclical against the real economy by setting
the policy rate to induce disinflation against positive credit growth. We then turn to
macroprudential policy, such as taxation or a subsidy on the cost of searching for credit
in the demand side of credit, i.e., firms, and total credit control that poses lending limits
on the supply side of credit, i.e., banks. We show that optimal macroprudential policy
reduces excessive variations of credit. A key finding is that optimal macroprudential
policy, primarily linked with financial stability, is indeed closely associated with price
stability, and consequently with monetary policy.
This paper is related to three strands of literature, but differs from the existing studies
in important ways. First, our paper is related to the existing work that adopts search-
theoretic models of the credit market, such as Wasmer and Weil (2000) and Den Haan,
Ramey, and Watson (2003). This framework enables elaborating the supply side of credit,
and is thus suitable for conducting policy analyses for financial stability. Furthermore,
Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2003) show that search and matching frictions in the
loan market substantially amplify business cycle shocks. This provides an interpretation
of Bernanke (1983), who shows that financial disruptions through credit misallocation
induced the unusual length and depth of the Great Depression. Credit market search
is therefore an appropriate mechanism for explaining financial disruptions against which
policy measures should play a role. Our paper, however, substantially differs from the
studies above in embedding credit market search into the standard New Keynesian model,
as well as in revealing the optimality criteria for policy measures.
Second, our paper is related to studies that follow Woodford (2003) and analyze the
optimal policy through a linear-quadratic approach, which makes use of the first order
approximation of the structural equations of the model and the second order approxi-
mation of welfare. Extending this approach, Teranishi (2015) and Cu´rdia and Woodford
(2016) introduce financial frictions into a standard New Keynesian model and derive
the optimal policy. They show that stabilizing credit spread and loan interest rate is
a principle for optimal policy, but they do not address bank behavior that induces se-
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rious financial disruptions. In contrast, our analysis shows that variables closely linked
to bank behavior, such as credit market tightness, credit growth, and over- and under-
lending, should be stabilized. Moreover, the former studies focus only on monetary
policy, whereas this paper investigates also macroprudential policy. Thomas (2008) and
Ravenna and Walsh (2011) pursue a linear-quadratic approach in models with search
and matching frictions in the labor market, and show that the objective function of the
monetary authority includes unemployment gaps. These authors, however, do not dis-
cuss the role of financial market frictions in the conduct of optimal monetary policy and
exclude roles of macroprudential policy.
Third, our paper is related to studies that explore the roles of macroprudential policy
in models with credit constraints. Bianchi and Mendoza (2013) build a model with a
pecuniary externality and a collateral constraint following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and derive optimal and time-consistent
macroprudential policy without commitment. Farhi and Werning (2016) introduce a
borrowing constraint into a model with nominal rigidities in goods and labor markets,
and show optimal interventions that are justified by an aggregate demand externality.7
These authors, however, do not focus on the supply side of credit and exclude direct
regulations on credit creation, and also, they do not analytically show the optimality
criteria for macroprudential policy.8 While we focus only on business cycles, defined
as deviations from an efficient steady state, and do not deal with types of externalities
discussed by these authors, we analytically show the stabilization of financial variables
as a principle of optimal macroprudential policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model. In
Section 3, we derive the second-order approximation of the social welfare function and
analyze an economy without policy response. In Section 4 and 5, we discuss optimal
monetary and macroprudential policy. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude the paper.
7Also see Bianchi (2010) and Korinek and Simsek (2015).
8An exception to this is where Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) build a model which features, in addition
to the liquidity constraint, the borrowing constraint for banks as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999), and evaluate macroprudential policies.
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2 Model
The model economy is populated by four types of private agents: a single representative
household (consumer), and large numbers of wholesale firms, banks, and retail firms.
We explain the problems faced by these agents in turn, then describe the credit market,
which is characterized by search and matching frictions, as well as the goods market.
2.1 Household
An infinitely lived representative household derives utility only from consumption, and
discounts the future with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). In period t, the household enjoys
total real consumption Ct and receives Πt as a real lump-sum profit from firms and banks,
and Tt as a real lump-sum transfer from the government. In addition, the household
deposits Dt into a bank account, to be repaid at the end of period t with a nominal
interest rate RDt − 1, where RDt is a policy variable of monetary policy.
Letting Pt denote the price of Ct, the household’s problem is
max
{Ct+i,Dt+i}∞i=0
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξtu(Ct+i), (1)
subject to the budget constraint
Ct = Πt + Tt +
RDt−1Dt−1 −Dt
Pt
. (2)
The household’s period utility function is
ξtu(Ct) ≡ ξt C
1−σ
t
1− σ , (3)
where ξt is an intertemporal preference shock which follows a known stochastic process,
and σ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
This optimization problem leads to
λt = ξtC
−σ
t , (4)
1 = βEt
[
λt+1
λt
Pt
Pt+1
RDt
]
, (5)
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where λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, (2).
Total consumption Ct is an aggregate of differentiated retail goods, labeled by j ∈
[0, 1]. Consumption of each good ct(j) is related to Ct by
Ct ≡
[∫ 1
0
ct(j)
εt−1
εt dj
] εt
εt−1
, (6)
where εt ∈ (1,∞) is the elasticity of substitution among retail goods, which follows a
known stochastic process. In what follows, random fluctuations of ξt and εt are the only
sources of aggregate uncertainty.
The household chooses each ct(j) to minimize cost
∫ 1
0
pt(j)ct(j)dj, given the level of
Ct and the price of each good, pt(j). This minimization yields
ct(j) =
[
pt(j)
Pt
]−εt
Ct , (7)
where
Pt ≡
[∫ 1
0
pt(j)
1−εtdj
] 1
1−εt
. (8)
2.2 Wholesale Firms
In any period, a wholesale firm can be either a productive firm or a credit seeker firm.
A productive firm produces Zt units of wholesale goods. To be productive, a firm must
obtain a real units of credit from a bank.
The credit market is characterized by search frictions, and the flow cost of posting
a vacancy is κ > 0 in real units. In addition, the government imposes tax τ ct on the
search cost κ as a tool of macroprudential policy for demand side of credit, and rebates
the tax revenue to the household as a lump-sum transfer Tt.
9 Thus, the total flow cost
of searching for a credit is (1 + τ ct )κ . When τ
c
t < 0, the policy amounts to a subsidy
for the firms’ search cost, financed by a lump-sum tax on the household. Thus, a credit
seeker firm must buy retail goods (1 + τ ct )κt(j), j ∈ (0, 1), to satisfy[∫ 1
0
κt(j)
εt−1
εt dj
] εt
εt−1 ≥ κ. (9)
9For example, Farhi and Werning (2016) also assume a financial tax on the demand side of credit.
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The cost minimization for κt(j) parallels that for ct(j) in the household’s problem. For
simplicity, we assume that firms finance the cost of searching for credit by issuing stocks
to the household.10
In period t, with probability pFt , a credit seeker firm is matched with a bank and
engages in a credit contract. The firm then receives a real units of credit and becomes
productive, sells the produced goods to retail firms, and repays RLt a to the bank, where
the loan interest rate RLt − 1 is determined in equilibrium. Finally, at the end of period
t, a credit contract is terminated with probability ρ ∈ (0, 1), in which case the firm and
the bank separate and search for new matches in period t + 1. With probability 1 − ρ,
a credit contract is sustained and the firm again receives credit in period t+ 1. We call
ρ the credit separation rate.
There is free entry into the wholesale goods industry. Thus, in equilibrium, the value
of a credit seeker firm is zero, and hence the cost of searching for credit must equal the
expected revenue, or
(1 + τ ct )κ = p
F
t Wt. (10)
Here, Wt is the value of a productive wholesale firm, written as
Wt =
Zt
µt
− (RLt − 1) a+ βEt [λt+1λt (1− ρ)Wt+1
]
, (11)
where
µt ≡ Pt
Pwt
(12)
is the price markup by retail firms, and Pwt is the price of a wholesale good. The first
two terms on the right-hand side (RHS) of equation (11) show the net current profit
from production, while the third term is the discounted present value of future profit.
Given these assumptions, the demand for retail good j and total demand are
ydt (j) ≡ ct(j) + κt(j)ut, (13)
10In an older version of our paper, Munakata, Nakamura, and Teranishi (2013) pursue an alternative
setup in which wholesale firms costlessly search for credit and banks pay the cost of posting vacancies.
The form of the approximated welfare function under this setup is identical to that obtained below.
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and
Y dt ≡ Ct + κut, (14)
respectively, where ut is the number of credit seeker firms. Note that the tax τ
c
t does
not enter these equations, since the entire tax revenue is rebated to the household. Also
note that ydt is related to Y
d
t by the following equation:
ydt (j) =
[
pt(j)
Pt
]−εt
Y dt . (15)
2.3 Banks
Banks collect money from the household as deposits, and lend it to wholesale firms.
To search for credit seeker firms, banks must post credit offers, which we call “credit
vacancies”. Posting credit vacancies is costless, but total funds available for lending is
capped at aL∗t , such that the upper limit of the number of credit contracts is L
∗
t .
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Therefore, the number of credit vacancies vt is expressed as
vt = L
∗
t − (1− ρ)Lt−1, (16)
where Lt is the number of productive wholesale firms. In period t, a credit vacancy is
filled with probability qBt . Thus, Lt evolves according to
Lt = (1− ρ)Lt−1 + qBt vt. (17)
In such settings, the value of a credit match for banks is
J1t = a(R
L
t − 1) + βEt
(
λt+1
λt
{
(1− ρ)J1t+1 + ρ
[
qBt+1J
1
t+1 + (1− qBt+1)J0t+1
]})
. (18)
The first term on the RHS of the equation shows current profit from lending, while the
second term represents discounted present value of future profit. On the other hand, the
value of a credit vacancy for banks is
J0t = βEt
{
λt+1
λt
[
qBt+1J
1
t+1 + (1− qBt+1)J0t+1
]}
. (19)
11For simplicity, we assume that aL∗t is less than the amount of deposit.
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Since a credit vacancy yields no current profit, it has only discounted future values.
These two equations imply that the bank’s surplus from a credit match is
Jt ≡ J1t − J0t = a(RLt − 1) + βEt
[
λt+1
λt
(1− ρ)(1− qBt+1)Jt+1
]
. (20)
We conclude the description of banks by explaining the nature of the upper limit of
credit contracts L∗t . In the real economy, when banks are allowed to extend ample loans,
the screening criteria become less strict, resulting in the deterioration of the average
productivity of projects funded by loans. To examine such a feature, we assume the
following relationship between L∗t and the productivity of wholesale firms Zt:
Zt = f(L
∗
t ). (21)
Here, the function f is strictly positive, strictly decreasing, strictly concave, and contin-
uously differentiable.
Furthermore, L∗t works as the macroprudential regulation of lending limit for supply
side of credit. This policy corresponds to a total credit control that is implemented in
some countries as explained in Lim et al. (2011) and Nier et al. (2011).12
2.4 Retail Firms
Retail firms produce differentiated retail goods from wholesale goods, which are then sold
to the household in a monopolistically competitive market. One unit of wholesale goods
is converted into one unit of retail good j. To introduce price stickiness, we assume that
a firm can adjust its price each period with probability 1−ω, as in Calvo (1983) and Yun
(1996). Since the demand for good j is given by equation (15), the profit maximization
problem of a retail firm that has a chance to adjust its price P ∗t becomes
max
P ∗t
Et
∞∑
i=0
(ωβ)i
[(
λt+i
λt
)(
(1 + τ)P ∗t − Pwt+i
Pt+i
)(
P ∗t
Pt+i
)−εt+i
Y dt+i
]
. (22)
12This policy is also interpreted as a capital adequacy ratio regulation that poses a constraint on
banks to supply credit as explained in Lim et al. (2011) and Nier et al. (2011).
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We here assume that the subsidy for retails firms τ is set to ensure that price flexibility is
achieved at the efficient steady-state equilibrium defined below. Note that Pt is related
to Pt−1 and P ∗t as
P 1−εtt = (1− ω) (P ∗t )1−εt + ωP 1−εtt−1 . (23)
2.5 Credit Market
The number of new credit matches in a period is given by a Cobb-Douglas matching
function
m (ut, vt) = χu
1−α
t v
α
t , χ, α ∈ (0, 1) . (24)
Defining credit market tightness as13
θt =
ut
vt
, (25)
we obtain
pFt = χθ
−α
t , (26)
qBt = χθ
1−α
t , (27)
Lt = (1− ρ)Lt−1 + χθ1−αt vt. (28)
The loan interest rate is determined according to generalized Nash bargaining between
the matched wholesale firm and bank. Thus, RLt solves
max
RLt
W 1−bt J
b
t , (29)
where b ∈ (0, 1) is the bargaining power for banks. The first-order condition with respect
to RLt yields
bWt = (1− b)Jt. (30)
Using equations (10), (26), (27), and (30) to eliminate pFt , q
B
t , Wt, and Jt from (11)
and (20), we obtain
(1 + τ ct )
κ
χ
θαt =
Zt
µt
− (RLt − 1)a+ βEt
[
λt+1
λt
(1− ρ)
(
1 + τ ct+1
)
κ
χ
θαt+1
]
(31)
13Note that in our environment, ut and vt correspond, respectively, to the demand and the supply of
credit. Thus, market tightness is defined as ut/vt, rather than its inverse.
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and
b
1− b
(1 + τ ct )κ
χ
θαt = (R
L
t − 1)a+ βEt
[
λt+1
λt
(1− ρ) (1− χθ1−αt+1 ) b1− b
(
1 + τ ct+1
)
κ
χ
θαt+1
]
.
(32)
By further eliminating RLt from these equations and using equation (4), we obtain the
following condition, which relates the markup µt to credit market tightness θt:
Zt
µt
=
1 + τ ct
1− b
κ
χ
θαt − βEt
[
ξt+1(Ct+1)
−σ
ξt(Ct)−σ
(1− ρ)1 + τ
c
t+1
1− b
(
κ
χ
θαt+1 − bκθt+1
)]
. (33)
Equation (33) shows that the credit market affects the real economy, that is, the price
setting behavior, through the cost channel.
2.6 Goods Market Clearing Condition
Since one unit of wholesale goods is needed as an input to produce one unit of each retail
good j, the market clearing condition for wholesale goods is
ZtLt =
∫ 1
0
ydt (j)dj. (34)
Together with the demand equation for retail goods (15), the following goods market
clearing condition is obtained:
ZtLt
Qt
= Ct + κut. (35)
Here,
Qt ≡
∫ 1
0
[
pt(j)
Pt
]−εt
dj (36)
represents the dispersion of prices of retail goods due to price stickiness for retail firms.
3 Economy without Policy Response
We first analyze an economy without any policy response. Thus, we set policy variables
at constant values, such as RDt = R¯
D, L∗t = L¯
∗ (and thus Zt = Z¯ ≡ f(L¯∗)), and
τ ct = 0.
14 This analysis serves to clarify the effect of optimal policy on the social welfare
and economic structure.
14Throughout, a bar above each variable implies its value in the efficient steady-state equilibrium.
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3.1 Welfare Criteria
We examine the optimal policy under the linear-quadratic approximation framework of
Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2012). In this section, we first
introduce the concepts of efficient stochastic equilibrium and efficient steady-state equi-
librium. The household’s utility function is expanded around the efficient steady-state
equilibrium to derive the second-order approximation of the welfare function. We then
comment on the implications of the approximated welfare function.
3.1.1 Efficient Stochastic Equilibrium
The efficient stochastic equilibrium is defined as the equilibrium of the economy without
the cost-push shock (i.e., εt = ε¯ for all t), whose allocation coincides with that of a benev-
olent social planner who maximizes the discounted lifetime utility of the representative
household. Such an equilibrium can be achieved only when the model exhibits neither
credit matching inefficiency nor price markup. Specifically, we assume throughout that
(1) the Hosios (1990) condition holds, that is, the bargaining power of banks (b) equals
the elasticity of the matching function with respect to credit vacancies (α), and (2) the
subsidy for retail firms τ is chosen to ensure µ¯ = ε¯
(ε¯−1)(1+τ) = 1.
By definition, the allocation in the efficient stochastic equilibrium is obtained by
solving the following optimization problem of the social planner:
max
{Cet+i,Let+i,vet+i,θet+i}∞i=0
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi{ξt+i(C
e
t+i)
1−σ
1− σ + φ
e
t+i
[
Z¯Let+i − κθet+ivet+i − Cet+i
]
(37)
+ νet+i
[
(1− ρ)Let+i−1 + χ(θet+i)1−αvet+i − Let+i
]
+ set+i
[
vet+i − L¯∗ + (1− ρ)Let+i−1
]},
where the superscript e represents the value of each variable in the efficient stochastic
equilibrium. This problem yields the following condition that characterizes the allocation
in the efficient stochastic equilibrium.
Z¯ =
1
1− α
κ
χ
(θet )
α − βEt
[
ξt+1(C
e
t+1)
−σ
ξt(Cet )
−σ (1− ρ)
1
1− α
(
κ
χ
(θet+1)
α − ακθet+1
)]
. (38)
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3.1.2 Efficient Steady-State Equilibrium
The efficient steady-state equilibrium is defined as a steady-state equilibrium of the
deterministic (i.e., ξt = ξ¯ = 1 and εt = ε¯ for all t) model, whose allocation coincides
with that of a benevolent social planner. By setting ξt = ξt+1 = 1 in (38) and removing
the expectation operator as well as subscripts and superscripts, we obtain the following
condition that characterizes the efficient steady-state equilibrium:
Z¯ − 1
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α = −β(1− ρ) 1
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α
(
1− αχθ¯1−α) . (39)
For later convenience, let
δ1 ≡ Z¯ − 1
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α, (40)
δ2 ≡ (1− ρ) 1
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α
(
1− αχθ¯1−α) , (41)
to simplify (39) as
δ1 = −βδ2. (42)
Since q¯B = χθ¯1−α ≤ 1, it follows that δ2 ≥ 0 and thus δ1 ≤ 0.
3.1.3 Policy Objective Function
Below, we express the log-deviation of a variable (e.g., Ct) from its efficient steady-state
value (C¯) by placing a hat (̂) over its lower case (ĉt); the difference, or the gap, between
such variable with a hat from its value in the efficient stochastic equilibrium is denoted
by placing a tilde (˜). We call c˜t ≡ ĉt − ĉet = lnCt − lnCet the consumption gap, and
similarly for other variables with a tilde.
As shown in Appendix A, the second-order expansion of the household’s utility func-
tion around the efficient steady-state equilibrium yields
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξt+iu(Ct+i) ' Vmax − 1
2
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiNt+i, (43)
where the maximum achievable welfare Vmax is given by
Vmax = Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξt+iu(C
e
t+i)−
1
2
λpi(1− ω)∆Vt−1, (44)
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while the period loss function Nt+i is given by
Nt+i = λpipi
2
t+i + λcc˜
2
t+i + λθθ˜
2
t+i. (45)
Here, pit ≡ p̂t − p̂t−1 is the inflation rate, λpi ≡ ucZ¯L¯ε¯/δ, λc ≡ σucC¯, λθ ≡ ucκu¯α,
uc ≡ u′(C¯), δ ≡ (1 − ω)(1 − ωβ)/ω, and ∆Vt ≡Varj p̂t(j) ≥ 0. On the RHS of equation
(43), Vmax represents, as observed from (44), the social welfare achieved by the social
planner less the welfare cost due to inherited price dispersion.15 Since these terms are
independent of policy, welfare maximization amounts to minimizing Et
∑∞
i=0 β
iNt+i; since
Nt+i is nonnegative and equals zero if and only if all gaps are zero, the social welfare
under the optimal policy is bounded above by Vmax.
Equation (45) shows that optimal policy faces a trade-off between variations in the
inflation rate, consumption, and credit market tightness. The presence of the market
tightness gap θ˜t in the approximated welfare function has a novel implication for optimal
policy – even when the real economy is perfectly stable, with zero gaps in consumption
and inflation, optimal policy should respond to an inefficient state of the credit market.
Thus, introduction of a frictional credit market provides a theoretical justification for
including financial stability as among the goals of optimal policy. We now explore in
more detail the economic wedge represented by each of the terms in Nt+i.
The first two terms in Nt+i are present also in the standard New Keynesian model
without credit market frictions. The inflation variation term pi2t+i results from price
dispersion due to price stickiness. Even when the aggregate consumption is at an efficient
level, price dispersion distorts the composition of differentiated retail goods that are
produced and consumed. The resulting welfare loss is captured by this term pi2t+i. Note
that when prices are flexible, i.e., ω = 0, we have δ =∞ and thus λpi = 0, such that the
inflation variation term disappears from the objective function. The term c˜2t+i, on the
other hand, appears here because consumption variation induces welfare loss due to the
concavity of the consumer’s utility function.
15The term representing welfare cost due to inherited price dispersion arises because we assume the
absence of such inherited price dispersion in the planner’s problem.
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The third term in Nt+i, θ˜
2
t+i, represents welfare loss due to inefficient variations in
credit market tightness. The weight on this term, λθ, depends on the model parameters
in a complicated fashion through the steady state number of credit seeker firms, u¯. As
shown below in Section 3.1.4, however, the relative importance of the variations in market
tightness to that in consumption, λθ/λc, increases with the search cost κ. This result is
intuitive since the presence of the term θ˜2t+i here is a result of introducing a frictional
credit market. In fact, without the cost of searching for credit, i.e., κ = 0, the term
θ˜2t+i is absent from the policy objective function, just like in a standard New Keynesian
model.16
Note that the approximated welfare function can be transformed as
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξt+iu(Ct+i) ' V max− 1
2
∞∑
i=0
βi
[
λpipi
2
t+i + λcc˜
2
t+i +
λθ
(1− α)2ρ2
(
l˜t+i − ρul˜t+i−1
)2]
,
(46)
where
ρu ≡ (1− ρ)
(
1− ρL¯
v¯
)
. (47)
Equation (46) clearly shows that the optimal policy should respond to the volume of
credit. Note that ρu ∈ (0, 1), since equations (27) and (28) yield ρL¯/v¯ = q¯B ∈ (0, 1). In
particular, as the separation rate ρ approaches 1, ρu approaches zero. This implies that
the optimal policy should focus on the current volume of credit, because the history of
the credit market is irrelevant when all matches are replaced each period. In contrast, as
ρ approaches zero, ρu approaches 1. In this limit, all existing loans continue to the next
period, so the optimal policy should focus on the volume of new loans, or equivalently,
on the growth of credit.
The result that the criteria for optimal policy directly includes the volume of credit
is a nontrivial finding. It justifies that optimal policy works for eliminating inefficient
dynamics of lending, such as an over- and under-lending. This is quite consistent with
16When κ = 0, the zero profit condition for credit seeker firms, equation (10), implies pFt = 0. That
is, there will be infinite number of credit seeker firms, and thus θt+1 =∞. To deal with such a situation,
we need to redefine the matching function as m (ut, vt) = min
{
χu1−αt v
α
t , ut, vt
}
. Then, qBt = 1 and
Lt = L¯
∗ for all t, such that all funds available for lending are lent out in all periods.
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the aim of macroprudential policy to stabilize the volume of loans.17
Furthermore, the approximated welfare includes both financial variables, such as
credit, and real economic variables, such as inflation and consumption. This finding
clearly contrasts with recent argument that insists that the macroprudential authority
should focus only on the financial variables.18
3.1.4 Analysis for Welfare Criteria
We now analyze the dependence of the welfare function on several parameters, especially
focusing on the weight of the term corresponding to financial frictions.
Straightforward calculation in Appendix B yields
∂
∂κ
(
λθ
λc
)
> 0, (48)
where the parameters (e.g., α) except κ are fixed, but the efficient steady-state value
of the variables (e.g., θ¯) are allowed to vary with κ. This relationship (48) implies
that, as the cost of searching for credit κ increases, the relative weight for credit to
that for consumption in the approximated welfare function (λθ/λc of equation (45))
increases. This is because as κ increases, the degree of financial friction and thus welfare
improvement from addressing inefficiency in the credit market becomes greater.
A similar relationship holds for the credit separation rate ρ, namely:
∂
∂ρ
(
λθ
λc
)
> 0. (49)
Again, this is because the increase in ρ raises the cost of holding credit.
These results imply that the relative weight for the credit term increases when the
cost of obtaining credit increases. In other words, as the degree of market imperfection
increases, the optimal policy should react more strongly to the credit market condition.
17For example, see BCBS (2010, 2014).
18For example, Drehmann, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2012) show that the credit–GDP ratio is a good
predictive indicator of financial crisis and emphasize that policymakers should use this ratio as the
criterion for implementing macroprudential policy.
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3.2 Linearization
In this subsection, we log-linearize the structural equations around the efficient steady-
state equilibrium. For a non-efficient stochastic equilibrium, the Calvo-type price sticki-
ness introduced in the retail sector leads to the standard Phillips curve with a cost-push
shock ε̂t,
pit = βEtpit+1 − δ
(
1
ε¯− 1 ε̂t + µ̂t
)
. (50)
The retail price markup term µ̂t in this equation can be obtained from the log-linearized
version of equation (33),
Z¯µ̂t = − α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α
(
θ̂t − βρuEtθ̂t+1
)
− βδ2
(
σEtĉt+1 − Etξ̂t+1 − σĉt + ξ̂t
)
, (51)
where equation (4) and the Hosios condition b = α is used.
From equations (4) and (5), the IS relation is given as
ĉt = Etĉt+1 +
1
σ
(
Etpit+1 − Etξ̂t+1 + ξ̂t
)
. (52)
On the other hand, by linearizing equations (16) and (28), we can express the credit
market tightness term θ̂t by utilizing the loan volume term l̂t in
θ̂t =
1
(1− α)ρ
(
l̂t − ρul̂t−1
)
. (53)
By combining equation (53) with the linearized equation of the market clearing condition
(equation (35)), the consumption term ĉt is given by
ĉt =
L¯δ2
C¯
(
−βl̂t + l̂t−1
)
. (54)
These equations are a closed system of the linearized economy around the efficient
steady-state equilibrium.19
Next, we log-linearize the structural equations of the efficient stochastic equilibrium
around the efficient steady-state equilibrium. The equation similar to the markup equa-
tion (51) is obtained by the log-linearizing equation (38) as
0 = − α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α
(
θ̂et − βρuEtθ̂et+1
)
− βδ2
(
σEtĉ
e
t+1 − Etξ̂t+1 − σĉet + ξ̂t
)
, (55)
19It is noteworthy that, by using linearized equations of (4) and (32) and equations (52)–(54), we
obtain a loan curve showing a relationship between the loan interest rate and credit volume. See a
detail of a loan curve in Appendix C.
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while the credit market tightness term and the consumption term are given by
θ̂et =
1
(1− α)ρ
(
l̂et − ρul̂et−1
)
, (56)
ĉet =
L¯δ2
C¯
(
−βl̂et + l̂et−1
)
. (57)
In addition, the deposit interest rate term for the efficient stochastic equilibrium r̂et is
implicitly defined by the the following equation that corresponds to the IS equation
(52):20
ĉet = Etĉ
e
t+1 +
1
σ
(
−r̂et − Etξ̂t+1 + ξ̂t
)
. (58)
Finally, by subtracting each structural equation of the efficient stochastic equilibrium
from its counterpart in the non-efficient stochastic equilibrium, we obtain the structural
equations in terms of gaps. More precisely, equations (51) and (55) yield
Z¯µ̂t = − α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α
(
θ˜t − βρuEtθ˜t+1
)
− βσδ2 (Etc˜t+1 − c˜t) , (59)
while equations (52) and (58) lead to
c˜t = Etc˜t+1 +
1
σ
(Etpit+1 + r̂
e
t ) . (60)
Similarly, equations (53) and (56) lead to
θ˜t =
1
(1− α)ρ
(
l˜t − ρul˜t−1
)
, (61)
and equations (54) and (57) yield
c˜t =
L¯δ2
C¯
(
−βl˜t + l˜t−1
)
. (62)
4 Optimal Policy
We now illustrate optimal policy under financial frictions by considering several monetary
and macroprudential policy tools. Throughout, optimal policy refers to the optimal
commitment policy under the timeless perspective.
20Here, r̂et = r
e
t − r¯, where ret and r¯ are, respectively, the interest rate in the efficient stochastic
equilibrium and the efficient steady-state equilibrium. We do not refer to r̂et as the gap in natural interest
rate since the flexible price equilibrium does not coincide with the efficient stochastic equilibrium due
to the presence of cost-push shocks.
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4.1 Monetary Policy
In this subsection, we investigate optimal monetary policy when the central bank is the
unique authority responsible for financial as well as real economic stability.21 Following
Woodford (2003), we assume that the central bank controls the nominal interest rate on
deposits, RDt , to maximize social welfare. In this case, equation (60) includes the deposit
interest rate gap, r˜Dt ≡ r̂Dt − r̂et , as
c˜t = Etc˜t+1 − 1
σ
(
r˜Dt − Etpit+1
)
. (63)
The central bank controls r˜Dt and thus the real deposit interest rate gap r˜
D
t −Etpit+1 by
varying r̂Dt . Accordingly, the central bank can affect consumption, and thus the entire
economy, through the IS relation given by equation (63). This is the typical transmission
channel of monetary policy in the literature.
It is noteworthy that by linearizing equations (5) and (32), the loan interest rate gap
r˜Lt is shown to be related to θ˜t and r˜
D
t as
aR¯Lr˜Lt =
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α
[
αθ˜t − β(1− ρ)
(
α− χθ¯1−α)Etθ˜t+1 (64)
+ β(1− ρ) (1− χθ¯1−α) (r˜Dt − Etpit+1) ].
In particular, equation (64) implies that when the deposit interest rate gap and credit
market tightness gap increase, so does the loan interest rate gap.
For the approximated welfare function in equation (43), the optimal policy for the
central bank is obtained by solving
min
{pit+i,θ˜t+i,c˜t+i,l˜t+i,r˜Dt+i}∞i=0
Et
∞∑
i=0
1
2
βi
(
λpipi
2
t+i + λθθ˜
2
t+i + λcc˜
2
t+i
)
, (65)
subject to the Phillips curve equation (50), the markup equation (59), the IS equation
(63), the credit market tightness equation (61), and the consumption equation (62).22
21To elaborate, we assume here that macroprudential policy variables are held constant (L∗t = L¯
∗ and
τ ct = 0) such that monetary policy is expected to play a macroprudential role as well.
22Optimal criteria for monetary policy given by equation (65) implies that, under credit market fric-
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The intertemporal preference shock terms ξ̂t and Etξ̂t+1 appear in neither the objective
function nor these constraints. Therefore, optimal monetary policy varies r̂Dt one-to-one
with r̂et to prevent the preference shock from affecting the deposit interest rate gap
r˜Dt and accordingly the gaps of inflation, market tightness, consumption, and the loan
volume. Thus, under optimal monetary policy, these gaps and consequently the welfare
loss depend solely on the cost-push shock; in the absence of the cost-push shock, optimal
monetary policy eliminates these gaps and achieves Vmax.
To further characterize optimal monetary policy, note that the first-order conditions
with respect to pit, θ˜t, c˜t, l˜t, and r˜
D
t are
λpipit + ϕ1t − ϕ1t−1 − β−1σ−1ϕ2t−1 = 0, (66)
λθθ˜t − δ
Z¯
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α(ϕ1t − ρuϕ1t−1) + ϕ3t = 0, (67)
λcc˜t − δδ2σ
Z¯
(ϕ1t−1 − βϕ1t) + ϕ2t − β−1ϕ2t−1 + ϕ4t = 0, (68)
− 1
(1− α)ρϕ3t +
βρu
(1− α)ρEtϕ3t+1 +
L¯δ2β
C¯
ϕ4t − L¯δ2β
C¯
Etϕ4t+1 = 0, (69)
ϕ2t = 0, (70)
where ϕ1t, ϕ2t, ϕ3t, and ϕ4t are the Lagrange multipliers for equations (50) (combined
with (59)), (63), (61), and (62), respectively. As shown in Appendix D.1, these first-order
conditions yield
ϕ1t = uc
Z¯L¯
δ
l˜t, (71)
ϕ3t = ϕ4t = 0. (72)
tions, simple policy rules should include terms related to credit. Without a credit market, Woodford
(2003) analytically shows that simple monetary policy rules, e.g, the Taylor rule, should respond to
inflation rate and consumption terms, since approximated welfare includes these terms and their sta-
bilization can improve welfare. A number of studies claim that a simple policy rule should include
variables related to credit under financial frictions. For example, Christiano et al. (2010), from numeri-
cal simulations, claim that policy should respond to credit in addition to inflation and the output gap to
improve welfare. Our results extend Woodford (2003) and theoretically support Christiano et al.(2010).
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Substituting equations (70) and (71) into equation (66) yields the optimal targeting rule
defined in Woodford (2003),
pit +
1
ε¯
(
l˜t − l˜t−1
)
= 0. (73)
The central bank adjusts the deposit interest rate RDt (and thus r˜
D
t ) to satisfy equation
(73). This optimal targeting rule and the linearized structural equations (50), (59), (61),
(62), and (63) define the paths of pit, θ˜t, c˜t, l˜t, and r˜
D
t under optimal monetary policy.
Equations (70) and (72) imply that constraints (61)–(63) do not bind under the cur-
rent environment. That the IS equation (63) is slack under optimal monetary policy
is not surprising, and it follows because the monetary authority can choose r˜Dt such
that the desired allocation satisfies (63). To see why the credit market tightness equa-
tion (61) and the consumption equation (62) are also slack, note that these two con-
straints combined represent the market clearing condition.23 Now, among the paths of(
θ˜t, c˜t, l˜t
)
that satisfy, for a given path of µ̂t, the market clearing condition and the
version of equation (59) for a general b ∈ (0, 1) (i.e., when the Hosios condition is not
imposed), the ones that satisfy the latter equation for b = α (i.e., equation (59)) maxi-
mize −Et
∑∞
i=0
1
2
βi
(
λθθ˜
2
t+i + λcc˜
2
t+i
)
. Further, when the IS equation (63) is slack, such
paths of
(
θ˜t, c˜t, l˜t
)
that maximize −Et
∑∞
i=0
1
2
βi
(
λθθ˜
2
t+i + λcc˜
2
t+i
)
for some path of µ̂t
also maximize social welfare. Thus, in the central bank’s problem, equation (59) already
takes into account equations (61) and (62).24
23Equation (62) is obtained by combining equation (61) with the market clearing condition. Then,
since no other equations in the central bank’s problem involves the loan volume term l˜t, the only role
played by equations (61) and (62) in this problem is to restrict the choices of credit market tightness
and consumption gap to those satisfying the market clearing condition.
24Appendix D.2 discusses in more detail why equations (61) and (62) are slack. Key in this argument is
that the central bank’s problem can be split into three parts, namely, (i) choosing the path of
(
θ˜t, c˜t, l˜t
)
for a given path of µ̂t, (ii) choosing the path of pit for a given path of µ̂t, and (iii) choosing the path of
µ̂t given (i) and (ii). When the monetary policy is not chosen optimally, the IS equation (63) imposes
an additional restriction on the relationship between consumption and inflation, hence the argument
breaks down and equation (72) generally fails to hold. The intuition is that imposing the Hosios condition
resolves search externalities, but not the distortions caused through the IS equation.
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The optimal targeting rule (73) has several important features. First, that equation
(73) includes both financial variables (l˜t and l˜t−1) and a real economic variable (pit) implies
the optimal targeting rule must maintain a balance between conditions in the financial
market and the real economy. By taking financial variables into account, monetary policy
may contribute to financial stability and perform the macroprudential role. This result
contrasts with the standard result shown in Woodford (2003): Under the model with
frictions in the goods market, that is, price stickiness, the loan volume gap l˜t is replaced by
the consumption gap c˜t, so optimal monetary policy focuses on the relationship between
inflation and consumption.
Second, when monetary policy serves a macroprudential role, optimality requires
keeping negative comovement between price and credit. In the optimal targeting rule,
the policy rate is set to induce disinflation against positive credit growth, so as to avoid
overheating or overcooling of the economy. This finding is consistent with the recent
argument claiming that preventing pro-cyclicality of financial markets can reduce the
occurrences of, and dampen the disruptions from, financial crises.25
4.2 Tax/Subsidy on the Search Cost as a Macroprudential Pol-
icy
In this subsection, we examine the macroprudential policy of varying tax τ ct on the
search cost κ of credit seeker firms. Here, we shut down the monetary policy as well as
the macroprudential policy of controlling the upper bound on credit supply by keeping
fixed RDt at R¯
D and L∗t at L¯
∗. Then, the linearized markup equation (59) is replaced by
Z¯µ̂t = − α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α(θ˜t − βρuEtθ˜t+1)− βσδ2 (Etc˜t+1 − c˜t)
− [(Z¯ + βδ2) τ ct − βδ2Etτ ct+1] . (74)
The optimal tax/subsidy policy minimizes the loss function (65) subject to the Phillips
curve equation (50), the markup equation (74), the IS equation (60), the credit market
25See, e.g., BIS (2009).
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tightness equation (61), and the consumption equation (62). As a result, while the first-
order conditions with respect to pit, θ˜t, c˜t, and l˜t are still given by equations (66)–(69),
equation (70) is replaced by the first-order condition with respect to τ ct ,
ϕ1t − δ2
Z¯ + βδ2
ϕ1t−1 = 0. (75)
Equation (74) suggests that the tax/subsidy policy changes the marginal cost of
production due to variation of the search cost for credit. As explained below, this policy
plays a role that is complementary to the monetary policy. Since the term τ ct does not
appear in the IS equation (52), the tax/subsidy policy fails to undo the preference shock,
which affects the gaps pit, θ˜t, c˜t, and l˜t in this equation through a change in r̂
e
t . However,
the tax/subsidy policy is able to completely offset the cost-push shock ε̂t, which acts
only on the Phillips curve equation. To see this, first substitute equation (74) into the
Phillips curve equation (50) to obtain
(pit − βEtpit+1)− δ
Z¯
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α
(
θ˜t − βρuEtθ˜t+1
)
+
δ
Z¯
βδ2σ (c˜t − Etc˜t+1)
= − δ
ε¯− 1 ε̂t +
δ
Z¯
(
Z¯ + βδ2
)(
τ ct −
βδ2
Z¯ + βδ2
Etτ
c
t+1
)
. (76)
Note that the RHS of equation (76) is freely controlled by varying τ ct . Now, suppose
the preference shock is absent so that r̂et = 0 for all t. Then, since the term ε̂t does
not appear in the objective function or other constraints, it follows that the optimal
tax/subsidy exactly cancels the cost-push shock by setting
τ ct =
Z¯
Z¯ + βδ2
ε̂t
ε¯− 1 +
βδ2
Z¯ + βδ2
Etτ
c
t+1. (77)
The optimal tax/subsidy policy given by equation (77) eliminates the gaps pit, θ˜t, c˜t, and
l˜t and achieves Vmax.
Equation (77) implies that if the cost-push shock ε̂t has no persistence or exhibits
positive autocorrelation, then optimal macroprudential policy under no preference shock
requires adjusting τ ct in the same direction as ε̂t. To understand this, suppose the econ-
omy is hit by a cost-push shock that raises inflation (ε̂t < 0). As observed from equation
(10), lowering the tax τ ct on the search cost reduces the equilibrium value of a productive
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wholesale firm and thus the match surplus, and therefore lowers the loan interest rate
RLt . This lowers the production cost of wholesale firms, causing a fall in the price of
wholesale goods relative to that of retail goods. This raises the markup µt of retail firms
and lowers inflation, thus cancelling the cost-push shock.
4.3 Optimal Combination of Monetary Policy and Tax/Subsidy
Policy on the Search Cost
As discussed in the previous two subsections, optimal monetary policy completely offsets
the preference shock but not the cost-push shock, while the macroprudential policy is
capable of fully cancelling the cost-push shock. Clearly, then, the optimal combination of
monetary and macroprudential policies are given by r˜Dt = 0 and (77) and completely can-
cel the cost-push and preference shocks in equations (63) and (76), thereby eliminating
the welfare loss.
The interpretation of these combined policy rules is straightforward. Optimal mon-
etary policy prevents the deviation of consumption from its efficient counterpart by off-
setting the effect that the preference shock has on the IS equation through r̂et . Optimal
macroprudential policy cancels the effect that the cost-push shock has on the Phillips
curve equation through varying the retail price markup. Clearly, any combinations of
shocks that affect only these structural equations can be offset by the optimal combina-
tion of monetary and tax/subsidy policy.
5 Extended Model with Total Credit Control as a
Macroprudential Policy Tool
In this section, we extend our baseline model by incorporating the macroprudential policy
of controlling the upper bound on credit supply L∗t . This policy corresponds to a total
credit control. In order to focus on this form of macroprudential policy, we set τ ct = 0
throughout this section.
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5.1 Total Credit Control as a Macroprudential Policy
We first inactivate the monetary policy by fixing the deposit interest rate RDt at R¯
D.
Note that in this extended model, the social-planner problem for obtaining the condi-
tion for efficient steady-state equilibrium treats L∗t as a choice variable. Observing that
the second order expansion of equation (21) is expressed as
Z¯
(
ẑt +
1
2
ẑ2t
)
' L¯∗
[
f¯1l̂
∗
t +
1
2
(
f¯1 + f¯2L¯
∗) l̂∗2t ] , (78)
where f¯1 ≡ f ′(L¯∗) < 0 and f¯2 ≡ f ′′(L¯∗) < 0, we obtain, as shown in Appendix E, in ad-
dition to equation (42), the following condition for the efficient steady-state equilibrium:
L¯f¯1 = − α
1− ακθ¯. (79)
Furthermore, the approximated welfare function becomes
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξt+iu(Ct+i) ' V ∗max −
1
2
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
λpipi
2
t+i + λθθ˜
2
t+i + λcc˜
2
t+i + λL∗ l˜
∗2
t+i
)
(80)
− Et
∞∑
i=0
βiψL∗ l˜
∗
t+il˜t+i,
where λL∗ ≡ ucL¯L¯∗2(−f¯2) > 0 and ψL∗ ≡ ucL¯∗ α1−ακθ¯ > 0.26
Equation (80) has a clear implication. The second-order term λL∗ l˜
∗2
t+i on the RHS is
the cost incurred by excessive variations in the limit of credit that induces, given the con-
cavity of f , efficiency losses in productivity. The linearity of the last term in l˜∗ suggests
that, when the volume of credit exceeds its value in the efficient stochastic equilibrium
(l˜ > 0), society is better off by restricting the supply of loans L∗ to a level below that in
the efficient stochastic equilibrium. This result serves as a theoretical foundation for set-
ting a lending limit as a macroprudential policy to eliminate inefficient supply of credit.
26The expression for the maximum achievable welfare V ∗max is given by the RHS of equation (44), just
like for Vmax. However, since the social planner is now equipped with an extra tool of varying L
∗
t , the
first term on the RHS of equation (44) in this extended model is weakly greater than that in the baseline
model. Thus, V ∗max ≥ Vmax, with the inequality being strict whenever varying L∗t is optimal.
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Furthermore, the time variation in productivity Zt, which depends on the upper limit
of credit L∗t , modifies the markup equation (59) as
Z¯µ̂t = − α
1− α
L¯∗
L¯
κθ¯l˜∗t −
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α
(
θ˜t − βρuEtθ˜t+1
)
(81)
− βσδ2 (Etc˜t+1 − c˜t) ,
and the relationship (61) between credit market tightness and the volume of credit as
θ˜t =
1
(1− α)ρ
[
l˜t − ρul˜t−1 −
(
ρ+ (1− ρ)χθ¯1−α) l˜∗t ] . (82)
Thus, when the macroprudential authority increases the upper bound on the credit
supply, tightness of the credit market loosens. Then, the marginal cost for production as
in equation (81), thus real economy as well as financial economy, responds to the policy.
We observe from above that depending on the macroprudential policy variable, the
form of the approximated welfare function and structural equations differ from that in
the economy without policy. This is because macroprudential policies themselves become
a part of the economy and change the economic structure. This simple but new finding
can be demonstrated via the approach of a model-consistent welfare approximation, and
is important in conducting optimal policies under new macroprudential policies.
Optimal macroprudential policy maximizes the approximated welfare in (80) subject
to the Phillips curve equation (50), the modified markup equation (81), the IS equation
(63), the modified credit market tightness equation (82), and the consumption equation
(62). Then, the first-order condition (69) is replaced by
ψL∗ l˜
∗
t −
1
(1− α) ρϕ3t +
βρu
(1− α) ρEtϕ3t+1 +
L¯δ2β
C¯
ϕ4t − L¯δ2β
C¯
Etϕ4t+1 = 0, (83)
while the first-order condition with respect to l˜∗t is given by
− λL∗ l˜∗t − ψL∗ l˜t +
δ
Z¯
α
1− α
L¯∗
L¯
κθ¯ϕ1t − 1
1− α
L¯∗
v¯
ϕ3t = 0. (84)
The first-order conditions (66)–(68), (83), and (84), along with equations (50), (60), (62),
(81), and (82), give the optimal paths of pit, θ˜t, c˜t, l˜t, and l˜
∗
t .
In this case, the optimal macroprudential measure of the upper bound on credit
supply is determined by both financial variables, such as credit market tightness and
27
loan volume, and real economic variables, such as inflation and consumption. From the
first-order conditions, the optimal instrumental rule defined in Woodford (2003) for the
policy variable l˜∗t is expressed as
27
Θ1(F,L)l˜
∗
t = Θ2(F,L)c˜t + Θ3(F,L)pit + Θ4(F,L)l˜t + Θ5(F,L)θ˜t, (85)
where Θ1, Θ2, Θ3, Θ4, and Θ5 are functions of lag operator L and forward operator
F. Equation (85) implies that the macroprudential authority needs to set the level of
lending limit depending on financial and real economic conditions.
As clarified in the next section, the total credit control policy turns out to be incapable
of fully offsetting the cost-push shock. Thus, even in the absence of the preference shock,
the total credit control policy fails to eliminate the welfare loss, unlike the case of the
optimal tax/subsidy on the search cost explained in Section 4.2.28 29
5.2 Optimal Combination of Monetary Policy and Total Credit
Control Policy
We now examine the consequence of the joint optimization of monetary and macropru-
dential policies. In this case, the first-order conditions include (70) in addition to those
mentioned above. As shown in Appendix G, these conditions yield equation (71) and
l˜∗t = ϕ3t = ϕ4t = 0. (86)
27See details of derivation in Appendix F.
28The optimal combination of monetary and total credit control policy achieves weakly greater social
welfare than the optimal total credit control policy alone, since the latter case amounts to imposing an
extra constraint, rˆDt = 0. As shown below in Section 5.2, even the optimal combination of monetary
and total credit control policy fails to achieve V ∗max, so the same is true here.
29On the other hand, even in the absence of cost-push shocks, the total credit control policy alone is
not able to fully offset the preference shock ξt. This observation is intuitive given that the total credit
control policy l˜∗t directly affects equations (81) and (82), while the preference shock, represented by the
interest rate shock r̂et , appears only in a different equation (60). We have numerically confirmed this
intuition.
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This simple equation suggests that when the monetary policy is optimized, it is optimal
to set l̂∗t at its value in the efficient stochastic equilibrium, l̂
∗e
t .
30 Since l̂∗et does not
vary with the cost-push shock, the optimal total credit control policy not simply fails
to eliminate, but in fact serves no role against the cost-push shock; as a result, the
combination of monetary and macroprudential policy fails to eliminate all gaps and to
achieve V ∗max. In particular, when the only source of uncertainty is the cost-push shock,
the efficient stochastic equilibrium coincides with the efficient steady-state equilibrium,
hence l˜∗t = 0 implies L
∗
t = L
∗e
t = L¯
∗; in this case, the active use of total credit control
policy yields no welfare improvement.
The reason why the total credit control policy plays no role against the cost-push
shock here is explained as follows. Unlike the tax/subsidy policy that directly alters the
markup of retail firms through its effect on the production cost of wholesale firms, the
total credit control policy alters the retail price markup only indirectly by affecting the
number of vacancies vt as well as productivity Zt and thereby varying output.
31 More-
over, since the monetary policy already optimizes output by taking into consideration its
trade-off with inflation, there is no additional net benefit from varying output through
the total credit control policy. Given the strict concavity of f , then, varying the upper
limit of credit contracts L∗t in response to the cost-push shock simply generates efficiency
losses in productivity; it is thus optimal to let L∗t exactly follow L
∗e
t .
32
30Even when the monetary policy is absent, the same conclusion for the total credit control policy
holds under flexible prices (ω = 0). This conclusion may be altered, however, if we introduce some
additional shocks that affect the structural equations.
31Note that the term τ ct appears only in the markup equation (74), while the term l˜
∗
t shows up not
only in the markup equation (81), but also in the welfare function (80) and in the credit market tightness
equation (82).
32In the first-order condition for l˜∗t (equation (84)), the second term represents the direct effect that
changes in output, resulting from changes in l˜∗t , have on welfare. Given equation (71), this term cancels
with the third term, which represents the indirect effect of changes in output on welfare that arises
through its impact on inflation. Optimal monetary policy, as discussed in Section 4.3, prevents the
IS equation (63) from binding, which in turn makes the credit market tightness equation (61) and the
consumption equation (62) also slack. Thus, the fourth term in equation (84) is zero. This leaves
29
6 Concluding Remarks
We extend a standard New Keynesian model by introducing search and matching frictions
into the credit market. In this model, the second-order approximation of social welfare
includes terms related to credit, such as credit market tightness, volume of credit, and
and upper bound of loan volume, in addition to inflation rate and consumption. This is
a new finding in the field of optimal policy. Then, we reveal several important features
for monetary policy and macroprudential policy.
For future research, the following points may be of interest. Through quantitative
assessment, establishing simple and optimal macroprudential and monetary policy rules
with credit terms is one important extension of this paper. It would be also interesting
to additionally introduce other search and matching frictions for a goods market and a
labor market and examine interactive effects of search and matching frictions on conduct
of monetary policy and macroprudential policy.
the first term, which corresponds to the efficiency losses in productivity from varying l˜∗t ; clearly, such
efficiency losses are minimized when l˜∗t = 0, or equivalently, l̂
∗
t = l̂
∗e
t . As this explanation makes clear,
the conclusion that l̂∗t should exactly follow l̂
∗e
t does not hold when, as in Section 5.1, the monetary
policy is not chosen optimally.
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Appendix
A Derivation of Equation (43)
Noting ξ¯ = 1, the second-order expansion of the household’s period utility function
around the efficient steady state yields
ξtu(Ct) ' u0 − 1
2
σucC¯ĉ
2
t + ucC¯
(
ĉt +
1
2
ĉ2t
)
+ ucC¯ξ̂tĉt + u0(ξ̂t +
1
2
ξ̂2t ) (87)
and thus
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξt+iu(Ct+i) ' u0
1− β −
1
2
σucC¯Et
∞∑
i=0
βiĉ2t+i + u0Et
∞∑
i=0
βi(ξ̂t+i +
1
2
ξ̂2t+i) (88)
+ ucC¯Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
ĉt+i +
1
2
ĉ2t+i
)
+ ucC¯Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξ̂t+iĉt+i,
where u0 ≡ u(C¯) = C¯1−σ/(1 − σ) and uc ≡ u′(C¯) = C¯−σ. Below, we first eliminate the
terms ĉt+i and ξ̂t+iĉt+i from this expression by rewriting each of the term in the second
line on the RHS. We then obtain a corresponding expression in the efficient stochastic
equilibrium and combine the two expressions to obtain equation (43).
Rewriting the Term ucC¯Et
∑∞
i=0 β
i
(
ĉt+i +
1
2 ĉ
2
t+i
)
We first focus on the term ucC¯Et
∑∞
i=0 β
i
(
ĉt+i +
1
2
ĉ2t+i
)
in equation (88).
By using the market clearing condition (35), we obtain
ĉt +
1
2
ĉ2t ' −
Z¯L¯
C¯
q̂t +
Z¯L¯
C¯
(
l̂t +
1
2
l̂2t
)
− κu¯
C¯
(
ût +
1
2
û2t
)
. (89)
Note that the efficient steady-state value of the price dispersion term Qt is Q¯ = 1, and
the log-deviation of this term q̂t is already in the second order, as shown below.
Expansion of equation (16) yields
v̂t +
1
2
v̂2t ' −η
(
l̂t−1 +
1
2
l̂2t−1
)
, (90)
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where η ≡ (1− ρ)L¯/v¯, while the expansion of equation (28) yields
1
ρ
(
l̂t +
1
2
l̂2t
)
− 1− ρ
ρ
(
l̂t−1 +
1
2
l̂2t−1
)
' (1− α)
(
θ̂t +
1− α
2
θ̂2t
)
+
(
v̂t +
1
2
v̂2t
)
+ (1− α)θ̂tv̂t. (91)
From equations (25), (90), and (91), we obtain
ût +
1
2
û2t '
1
ρ(1− α)
(
l̂t +
1
2
l̂2t
)
− L¯
κu¯
δ2
(
l̂t−1 +
1
2
l̂2t−1
)
+
1
2
αθ̂2t . (92)
Combining equations (89) and (92) yields
ucC¯
(
ĉt +
1
2
ĉ2t
)
' −ucZ¯L¯q̂t−ucκu¯α
2
θ̂2t +ucL¯
(
δ1l̂t + δ2l̂t−1
)
+
1
2
ucL¯
(
δ1l̂
2
t + δ2l̂
2
t−1
)
(93)
and therefore
ucC¯Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
ĉt+i +
1
2
ĉ2t+i
)
' −ucZ¯L¯Et
∞∑
i=0
βiq̂t+i − ucκu¯
2
αEt
∞∑
i=0
βiθ̂2t+i (94)
+ ucL¯Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
δ1l̂t+i + δ2l̂t+i−1
)
+
1
2
ucL¯Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
δ1l̂
2
t+i + δ2l̂
2
t+i−1
)
.
From the efficient steady-state condition (42), the second line on the RHS of equation
(94) equals ucL¯δ2l̂t−1 + 12ucL¯δ2l̂
2
t−1. Therefore, we obtain
ucC¯Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
ĉt+i +
1
2
ĉ2t+i
)
' −ucZ¯L¯Et
∞∑
i=0
βiq̂t+i − ucκu¯α
2
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiθ̂2t+i + ucL¯δ2l̂t−1 +
1
2
ucL¯δ2l̂
2
t−1. (95)
We now rewrite the first term on the RHS of equation (95). From equation (36),
q̂t =
∫ 1
0
dj exp [−εt (p̂t(j)− p̂t)]− 1 (96)
' −ε¯(∆Et − p̂t)(1 + ε̂t) +
1
2
ε¯2
[
∆Vt +
(
∆Et − p̂t
)2]
,
where ∆Et ≡ Ej p̂t(j) =
∫ 1
0
p̂t(j)dj and ∆
V
t ≡Varj p̂t(j) = Ej p̂t(j)2 − (Ej p̂t(j))2. The
definition of the aggregate price Pt given by equation (23) can be used to show that
∆Et − p̂t ' −
1
2
(1− ε¯)∆Vt . (97)
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Thus, up to the second order in p̂t, we can rewrite q̂t as
q̂t ' 1
2
ε¯∆Vt , (98)
leading to
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiq̂t+i ' 1
2
ε¯Et
∞∑
i=0
βi∆Vt+i. (99)
On the other hand, the expression defining ∆Vt is written as
∆Vt = Ej(p̂t(j)−∆Et−1)2 − (∆Et −∆Et−1)2. (100)
Here, recall that only fraction 1 − ω of all firms adjust their prices to P ∗t , while other
firms do not change their prices pt−1(j). This condition yields
P 1−εtt = (1− ω)(P ∗t )1−εt + ωP 1−εtt−1 . (101)
Also note that, by using the same condition, equation (100) can be restated as
∆Vt = ωEj(p̂t−1(j)−∆Et−1)2 + (1− ω)(p̂∗t −∆Et−1)2 − (∆Et −∆Et−1)2, (102)
where p̂∗t is the log-deviation of P
∗
t .
By taking the log-deviation of both sides of equation (101), p̂∗t can be expressed by
p̂t and p̂t−1. Substituting this equation into equation (102) yields
∆Vt ' ω∆Vt−1 + (1− ω)
(
1
1− ω p̂t −
ω
1− ω p̂t−1 − p̂t−1
)2
− (p̂t − p̂t−1)2 , (103)
up to the second order in p̂t. Using pit = p̂t − p̂t−1, we thus have
∆Vt ' ω∆Vt−1 +
ω
1− ωpi
2
t . (104)
and thus let δ = (1− ω)(1− ωβ)/ω,
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi∆Vt+i ' ω∆Vt−1 + ωβEt
∞∑
i=0
βi∆Vt+i +
ω
1− ωEt
∞∑
i=0
βipi2t+i
=
1
δ
Et
∞∑
i=0
βipi2t+i +
ω
1− ωβ∆
V
t−1. (105)
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Finally, substituting equations (99) and (105) into equation (95) yields
ucC¯Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
ĉt+i +
1
2
ĉ2t+i
)
' −1
2
λpiEt
∞∑
i=0
βipi2t+i −
1
2
λpi(1− ω)∆Vt−1 (106)
− 1
2
λθEt
∞∑
i=0
βiθ̂2t+i + ucL¯δ2l̂t−1 +
1
2
ucL¯δ2l̂
2
t−1,
where λpi = ucZ¯L¯ε¯/δ and λθ = ucκu¯α.
Rewriting the Term ucC¯Et
∑∞
i=0 β
iξ̂t+iĉt+i
We now rewrite the term ucC¯Et
∑∞
i=0 β
iξ̂t+iĉt+i. Using equations (54) and (55), we have
ucC¯Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξ̂t+iĉt+i = ucL¯δ2Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
ξ̂t+il̂t+i−1 − βξ̂t+il̂t+i
)
= ucL¯δ2Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
ξ̂t+il̂t+i−1 − β
[
ξ̂t+i+1 − σ(ĉet+i+1 − ĉet+i)
− 1
βδ2
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α(θ̂et+i − βρuθ̂et+i+1)
]
l̂t+i
)
= ucL¯δ2Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
ξ̂t+il̂t+i−1 − βξ̂t+i+1l̂t+i
)
(107)
+ ucL¯δ2Et
∞∑
i=0
βiβσ(ĉet+i+1 − ĉet+i)l̂t+i
+ ucL¯
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯αEt
∞∑
i=0
βi(θ̂et+i − βρuθ̂et+i+1)l̂t+i.
On the RHS of (107), the first term is written as
ucL¯δ2Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
ξ̂t+il̂t+i−1 − βξ̂t+i+1l̂t+i
)
= ucL¯δ2ξ̂tl̂t−1. (108)
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The second term becomes
ucL¯δ2Et
∞∑
i=0
βiβσ(ĉet+i+1 − ĉet+i)l̂t+i
= ucL¯δ2Et
∞∑
i=0
βiβσ(ĉet+i+1l̂t+i − ĉet+ilt+i)
= ucL¯δ2σEt
∞∑
i=0
βi
[
βĉet+i+1l̂t+i − ĉet+i
(
l̂t+i−1 − C¯
L¯δ2
ĉt+i
)]
= ucL¯δ2σEt
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
βĉet+i+1l̂t+i − ĉet+il̂t+i−1
)
+ ucσC¯Et
∞∑
i=0
βiĉet+iĉt+i
= −ucL¯δ2σĉet l̂t−1 + σucC¯Et
∞∑
i=0
βiĉet+iĉt+i, (109)
where we have used equation (54) to obtain the second equality.
Finally, the third term on the RHS of (107) is rewritten as
ucL¯
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯αEt
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i=0
βi(θ̂et+i − βρuθ̂et+i+1)l̂t+i
= ucL¯
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯αEt
∞∑
i=0
βi(θ̂et+il̂t+i − βρuθ̂et+i+1l̂t+i)
= ucL¯
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯αEt
∞∑
i=0
βi
[
θ̂et+i
(
(1− α)ρθ̂t+i + ρul̂t+i−1
)
− βρuθ̂et+i+1l̂t+i
]
= ucL¯α
κ
χ
θ¯αρEt
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i=0
βiθ̂et+iθ̂t+i + ucL¯
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯αρuEt
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
θ̂et+il̂t+i−1 − βθ̂et+i+1l̂t+i
)
= λθEt
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i=0
βiθ̂et+iθ̂t+i + ucL¯
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯αρuθ̂
e
t l̂t−1, (110)
where we have used equation (54) to obtain the second equality.
Using equations (108)–(110) and letting λc = σucC¯, equation (107) becomes:
ucC¯Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξ̂t+iĉt+i = λθEt
∞∑
i=0
βiθ̂et+iθ̂t+i + λcEt
∞∑
i=0
βiĉet+iĉt+i (111)
+ ucL¯δ2ξ̂tl̂t−1 − ucL¯δ2σĉet l̂t−1 + ucL¯
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯αρuθ̂
e
t l̂t−1.
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Combining the Results
Substituting equations (106) and (111) into equation (88) yields
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξt+iu(Ct+i) (112)
' −1
2
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi(λpipi
2
t+i + λcĉ
2
t+i + λθθ̂
2
t+i) + λθEt
∞∑
i=0
βiθ̂et+iθ̂t+i + λcEt
∞∑
i=0
βiĉet+iĉt+i
+ u0Et
∞∑
i=0
βi(ξ̂t+i +
1
2
ξ̂2t+i) + ucL¯δ2ξ̂tl̂t−1 − ucL¯δ2σĉet l̂t−1 + ucL¯
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯αρuθ̂
e
t l̂t−1
+
u0
1− β + ucL¯δ2l̂t−1 +
1
2
ucL¯δ2l̂
2
t−1 −
1
2
λpi(1− ω)∆Vt−1.
Note that in the efficient stochastic equilibrium, there is neither inherited price disper-
sion nor price changes over time. Thus, the counterpart of equation (112) in the efficient
stochastic equilibrium is obtained by setting pi2t+i = ∆
V
t−1 = 0 and putting superscript
e
on endogenous variables (except l̂t−1, which is pretermined at date t) as
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξt+iu(C
e
t+i)
' −1
2
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi(λc(ĉ
e
t+i)
2 + λθ(θ̂
e
t+i)
2) + λθEt
∞∑
i=0
βi(θ̂et+i)
2 + λcEt
∞∑
i=0
βi(ĉet+i)
2 (113)
+ u0Et
∞∑
i=0
βi(ξ̂t+i +
1
2
ξ̂2t+i) + ucL¯δ2ξ̂tl̂t−1 − ucL¯δ2σĉet l̂t−1 + ucL¯
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯αρuθ̂
e
t l̂t−1
+
u0
1− β + ucL¯δ2l̂t−1 +
1
2
ucL¯δ2l̂
2
t−1.
Subtracting equation (113) from (112) yields the approximated welfare function given by
equation (43), which is accurate up to the second order in the log-linearized variables.
B Proof of Inequalities (48) and (49)
The first step for the proof is to express
λθ
λc
=
α
σ
κu¯
C¯
(114)
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in terms of θ¯. By evaluating equations (16), (25), (28), and (35) at the efficient steady-
state equilibrium, we obtain
u¯ =
ρθ¯
ρ+ (1− ρ)χθ¯1−αL
∗ (115)
and
C¯ =
Z¯χθ¯1−α − κρθ¯
ρ+ (1− ρ)χθ¯1−αL
∗. (116)
From equations (114)–(116), we have
λθ
λc
=
α
σ
ρκ
χ
θ¯α
Z¯ − ρκ
χ
θ¯α
. (117)
By taking the partial derivative with respect to κ, we obtain
∂
∂κ
(
λθ
λc
)
=
α
σ
Z¯
(Z¯ − ρκ
χ
θ¯α)2
∂
∂κ
(
ρ
κ
χ
θ¯α
)
=
α
σ
Z¯
(Z¯ − ρκ
χ
θ¯α)2
ρ
χ
(
καθ¯α−1
∂θ¯
∂κ
+ θ¯α
)
. (118)
On the other hand, taking the partial derivative of equation (39) with respect to κ
yields the following expression for ∂θ¯/∂κ:[
κ
χ
αθ¯α−1 (1− β(1− ρ)) + αβ(1− ρ)κ
]
∂θ¯
∂κ
+
1
χ
θ¯α (1− β(1− ρ)) + αβ(1− ρ)θ¯ = 0. (119)
Finally, by eliminating ∂θ¯/∂κ from equations (118) and (119), we prove inequality
(48). Inequality (49) can be shown in a similar way.
C Loan Curve
From linearized equations of (4) and (32) and equations (52)–(54), we can derive a loan
curve as
r̂Lt = h1Etl̂t+1 + h2l̂t + h3l̂t−1 − h4
(
Etξ̂t+1 − ξ̂t
)
, (120)
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where
h1 ≡ 1
h5
[
−β (1− ρ)
ρ
(α− χθ1−α)
1− α − β
2σρu
L¯
C¯
δ2
]
,
h2 ≡ 1
h5
[
α
(1− α)ρ + β
(1− ρ)
ρ
(α− χθ1−α)
1− α ρu + βσρu
L¯
C¯
δ2(1 + β)
]
,
h3 ≡ 1
h5
[
− α
1− α
ρu
ρ
− βσρu L¯
C¯
δ2
]
,
h4 ≡ 1
h5
βρu,
h5 ≡ a (1− α)χR¯
L
ακθ
α .
Thus, the loan interest rate and credit volume are closely related. By using equation
(120), it is possible to include the loan rate term in the approximated welfare function.
The welfare function that includes the loan interest rate is consistent with those in
Teranishi (2015) and Cu´rdia and Woodford (2016). Teranishi (2015) shows that under
the staggered cost channel model, an approximated welfare function includes growth of
the loan interest rate. Cu´rdia and Woodford (2016) show that an approximated welfare
function includes the credit spread term under a model where households face financial
market frictions.
D Derivation and Intuition of the Optimal Mone-
tary Policy Rules
D.1 Derivation of Equations (71) and (72)
Let us first eliminate θ˜t and c˜t from equations (67) and (68) by using equations (61),
(62), and (70). This leads to
ϕ3t =
δ
Z¯
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α(ht − ρuht−1), (121)
ϕ4t =
δδ2σ
Z¯
(−βht + ht−1), (122)
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where
ht ≡ ϕ1t − λθZ¯χ
δαρκθ¯α
l˜t = ϕ1t − uc Z¯L¯
δ
l˜t. (123)
By substituting equations (121) and (122) into equation (69), we obtain
Etht+1 − k1ht − k2ht−1 = 0, (124)
where
k1 ≡ 1 + βρ
2
u + ζ (1 + β)
β (ρu + ζ)
, (125)
k2 ≡ − 1
β
, (126)
and
ζ ≡ β (1− α)
2
α
ρσδ22
L¯
C¯
χ
κθ¯α
. (127)
The path of ht described by the second difference equation (124) is dynamically stable
if and only if both roots of the characteristic equation
h2 − k1h− k2 = 0 (128)
are inside the unit circle, which is equivalent to |k1| < 1 − k2 and k2 > −1.33 Since
β < 1, however, k2 = −1/β < −1 and thus the stability condition is not satisfied. The
optimal policy therefore requires ht = 0 for all t, because otherwise, the path of ht will
be divergent, which is clearly suboptimal. Thus, equation (71) follows from equation
(123), while equation (72) follows from equations (121) and (122).
D.2 Intuition for Equation (72)
In this section, we provide an intuition for equation (72), that is, why the constraints
(61) and (62), which together serve as the restriction from the market clearing condition,
do not bind. As explained below, this result follows because in the presence of optimal
monetary policy, the markup equation (51) incorporates the market clearing condition.
33See, e.g., Enders (2004, Chapter 1). Enders, W., 2004. Applied Econometric Time Series, 2nd ed.
John Wiley and Sons, New York, NY.
43
Note that in the central bank’s problem in Section 4.1, the IS equation (63) is
slack because it can always be satisfied by an adequate choice of r˜Dt+i. We can thus
remove the IS equation (63) from the constraint and consider the problem of choos-
ing
{
pit+i, θ˜t+i, c˜t+i, l˜t+i
}∞
i=0
. Then, clearly, for any path of µˆt, the problem of choosing
the path of
(
θ˜t, c˜t, l˜t
)
is independent of the problem of choosing the path of pit. More
precisely, the former problem is of maximizing − (1/2)Et
∑∞
i=0 β
i
(
λcc˜
2
t+i + λθθ˜
2
t+i
)
with
respect to
{
θ˜t+i, c˜t+i, l˜t+i
}∞
i=0
subject to equations (59), (61), and (62), taking {µˆt+i}∞i=0
as given. Let us explore this problem, ignoring for now the latter two constraints.
The Lagrangian for the simplified problem of maximizing
− (1/2)Et
∑∞
i=0 β
i
(
λcc˜
2
t+i + λθθ˜
2
t+i
)
subject to equation (59) is written as
L = Et
∞∑
i=0
βi{−1
2
(
λcc˜
2
t+i + λθθ˜
2
t+i
)
(129)
+ φt+i
[
Z¯µ̂t+i +
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α
(
θ˜t+i − βρuEtθ˜t+i+1
)
+ βσδ2 (Etc˜t+i+1 − c˜t+i)
]
}.
Taking the first-order conditions with respect to c˜t+i and θ˜t+i and rearranging yields
θ˜t =
1
λθ
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α (φt − ρuφt−1) = 1
(1− α) ρ
1
ucL
(φt − ρuφt−1) , (130)
c˜t =
δ2σ
λc
(−βφt + φt−1) = Lδ2
C¯
1
ucL
(−βφt + φt−1) . (131)
Equations (130) and (131) reveal that the solution to this simplified problem can always
be made to satisfy equations (61) and (62) by setting l˜t = φt/ (ucL).
34 Since this ar-
gument holds for any path of µ̂t, equations (61) and (62) do not bind in the original
problem of the central bank.
To understand the role played by the Hosios condition in the result above, let the
banks’ bargaining power b take on a general value in [0, 1], in which case equation (59)
34This condition can be rewritten as φt = ucLl˜t = uc (Lt − Let ), whose intuition is explained as
follows. Relaxing constraint (59) by one unit enables increasing each wholesale firm’s output by 1 unit,
or equivalently, the aggregate wholesale good production by Lt units; these wholesale goods are then
converted into Lt units of final goods, whose utility value is approximately ucLt. The same explanation
implies that the corresponding increase in utility in the efficient stochastic state is ucL
e
t , hence the value
of relaxing constraint (59) is φt = uc (Lt − Let ).
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is replaced by
Z¯µ̂t = − b
1− b
κ
χ
θ¯α
(
θ˜t − βρuEtθ˜t+1
)
− βσδ2 (Etc˜t+1 − c˜t) (132)
+
(
α
1− α −
b
1− b
)
κ
χ
θ¯α
(
θ̂et − βρuEtθ̂et+1
)
.
The Hosios condition makes the loan interest rate determined by the bargaining be-
tween the bank and the wholesale firm, and the resulting equation (132), socially efficient
in the following sense. Among the paths of
(
θ˜t, c˜t, l˜t
)
that satisfy, for a given path of
µ̂t, the market clearing condition and equation (132) for a general b ∈ (0, 1), the ones that
satisfy equation (132) for b = α (i.e., equation (59)) maximize−Et
∑∞
i=0
1
2
βi
(
λθθ˜
2
t+i + λcc˜
2
t+i
)
.
Thus, in the central bank’s problem, equation (59) already takes into account equations
(61) and (62) that correspond to the market clearing condition.
The argument above hinges on the fact that the paths of
(
θ˜t, c˜t, l˜t
)
that maximize, for
some path of µˆt, the function − (1/2)Et
∑∞
i=0 β
i
(
λcc˜
2
t+i + λθθ˜
2
t+i
)
subject to equations
(61), (62), (132) coincide with the optimal paths of
(
θ˜t, c˜t, l˜t
)
in the original problem of
the central bank. This is no longer true when optimal monetary policy is absent as in
Section 4.2. In such a case, satisfaction of the Hosios condition does not make equation
(132) socially efficient, since the resulting equation (59) pays no consideration to the
restriction imposed by the IS equation (60) on the relation between c˜t and pit. In other
words, unlike the search externality, the distortion arising through the IS equation (60)
is not addressed by the Hosios condition.
E Derivation of Equations (79) and (80)
We here adopt the upper bound of the credit supply L∗t as an additional policy tool and
assume the relation (21) between this variable and the productivity of wholesale firms
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Zt. The social planner then solves the following problem:
max
{Cet+i,Let+i,vet+i,θet+i,L∗et+i}∞i=0
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi{ξt+i(C
e
t+i)
1−σ
1− σ + φ
e
t+i
[
f(L∗et+i)L
e
t+i − κθet+ivet+i − Cet+i
]
(133)
+ νet+i
[
(1− ρ)Let+i−1 + χ(θet+i)1−αvet+i − Let+i
]
+ set+i
[
vet+i − L∗et+i + (1− ρ)Let+i−1
]}.
By taking the first-order conditions and rearranging them, we obtain
f(L∗et ) =
1
1− α
κ
χ
(θet )
α − βEt
[
ξt+1(C
e
t+1)
−σ
ξt(Cet )
−σ (1− ρt)
1
1− α
(
κ
χ
(θet+1)
α − ακθet+1
)]
,
(134)
and
Letf
′(L∗et ) = −
α
1− ακθ
e
t . (135)
The latter equation becomes equation (79) by evaluating it at the steady state.
To obtain the second-order approximation of welfare, equation (80), we only need
to allow the time variation of L∗t and Zt and conduct the calculation similar to that
explained in Appendix A for the baseline model. This time, the equation corresponding
to equation (89) is given by
ĉt +
1
2
ĉ2t '
Z¯L¯
C¯
(ẑt +
1
2
ẑ2t + ẑtl̂t − q̂t) +
Z¯L¯
C¯
(
l̂t +
1
2
l̂2t
)
− κu¯
C¯
(
ût +
1
2
û2t
)
, (136)
while the expansion of the number of credit seeker firms (92) is modified as:
ût +
1
2
û2t '
1
ρ(1− α)
(
l̂t +
1
2
l̂2t
)
− L¯
κu¯
δ2
(
l̂t−1 +
1
2
l̂2t−1
)
(137)
+
1
2
α
ρ2(1− α)2
(
l̂t − ρul̂t−1 −
(
ρ+ (1− ρ)χθ¯1−α) l̂∗t)2
− α
1− α
L¯∗
v¯
(
l̂∗t +
1
2
l̂∗2t
)
.
These two equations yield
ξtu(Ct) ' u0 + ucZ¯L¯
(
ẑt +
1
2
ẑ2t + ẑtl̂t − q̂t
)
+ uc
α
1− ακθ¯L¯
∗
(
l̂∗t +
1
2
l̂∗2t
)
+ ucC¯
[
L¯
C¯
(
δ1l̂t + δ2l̂t−1
)
+
L¯
2C¯
(
δ1l̂
2
t + δ2l̂
2
t−1
)]
− ucκu¯
2
αθ̂2t −
1
2
σucC¯ĉ
2
t + ucC¯ξ̂tĉt + u0(ξ̂t +
1
2
ξ̂2t ). (138)
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Some of the terms in equation (138) can be rearranged by using equations (78) and (79)
as follows:
ucZ¯L¯
(
ẑt +
1
2
ẑ2t + ẑtl̂t
)
+ uc
α
1− ακθ¯L¯
∗
(
l̂∗t +
1
2
l̂∗2t
)
= ucL¯
[
f¯1L¯
∗l̂∗t +
1
2
L¯∗
(
f¯1 + f¯2L¯
∗) l̂∗2t + f¯1L¯∗l̂∗t l̂t]+ uc α1− ακθ¯L¯∗
(
l̂∗t +
1
2
l̂∗2t
)
= ucL¯
∗
(
L¯f¯1 +
α
1− ακθ¯
)(
l̂∗t +
1
2
l̂∗2t
)
+
1
2
ucL¯L¯
∗2f¯2l̂∗2t + ucf¯1L¯L¯
∗l̂∗t l̂t
= 0 +
1
2
ucL¯L¯
∗2f¯2l̂∗2t − ucL¯∗
α
1− ακθ¯l̂
∗
t l̂t
= −1
2
λL∗ l̂
∗2
t − ψL∗ l̂∗t l̂t. (139)
We therefore see that equation (138) is simplified as
ξtu(Ct) ' u0 − ucZ¯L¯q̂t − 1
2
λL∗ l̂
∗2
t − ψL∗ l̂∗t l̂t
+ ucC¯
[
L¯
C¯
(
δ1l̂t + δ2l̂t−1
)
+
L¯
2C¯
(
δ1l̂
2
t + δ2l̂
2
t−1
)]
− ucκu¯
2
αθ̂2t −
1
2
σucC¯ĉ
2
t + ucC¯ξ̂tĉt + u0(ξ̂t +
1
2
ξ̂2t ). (140)
The rest of the argument closely follows that in Appendix A, the only difference being
that the linearized version of equation (135) is additionally used.
F Derivation of Equation (85)
From the first-order conditions (66)–(68), (83), and (84), we can eliminate the Lagrange
multipliers and express l˜∗t as a function of other endogenous variables as[
1 +
λL∗σδ2βZ¯L¯
2
ψL∗ακδC¯L¯∗
(1− F) 1− α
θ¯
ST−1 − λL∗L¯θ¯
α−1
ψL∗χ (1− α) ρL¯∗ (1− βρuF) T
−1 (1− ρuL)
]
l˜∗t
=
λcδ2βL¯
ψL∗C¯
(1− F) c˜t − λpiδ2βσL¯
ψL∗C¯
(1− F) (1− βF) pit (141)
+
L¯
L¯∗
[
θ¯α−1
(1− α) ρχ (1− βρuF) T
−1 (1− ρuL)− σδ2βZ¯L¯
C¯ακδ
(1− F) 1− α
θ¯
ST−1
]
l˜t
+
λθ
ψL∗
[
σδ2βZ¯L¯
2
δακθ¯v¯C¯
(1− F) ST−1 − 1
(1− α) ρ (1− βρuF) T
−1
]
θ˜t,
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where
S ≡ −βF +
(
−β δδ2
Z¯
+ β + 1
)
+
(
δδ2
Z¯
− 1
)
L, (142)
T ≡
(
1− 1
1− α
θ¯α−1
χ
L¯
v¯
)
+
ρu
1− α
θ¯α−1
χ
L¯
v¯
L. (143)
Clearly, this equation can be rewritten in the form of equation (85).
G Derivation of Equation (86)
Let us first eliminate θ˜t and c˜t from equations (67) and (68) by using equations (62),
(70), and (82). This leads to
ϕ3t =
δ
Z¯
α
1− α
κ
χ
θ¯α(ht − ρuht−1) + α
1− αucκθ¯L¯
∗l˜∗t , (144)
ϕ4t =
δδ2σ
Z¯
(−βht + ht−1), (145)
where
ht ≡ ϕ1t − λθZ¯χ
δαρκθ¯α
l˜t = ϕ1t − uc Z¯L¯
δ
l˜t. (146)
In addition, equation (84) is rewritten using ht as
λL∗ l˜
∗
t −
δ
Z¯
α
1− α
L¯∗
L¯
κθ¯ht +
1
1− α
L¯∗
v¯
ϕ3t = 0. (147)
By eliminating l˜∗t , ϕ3t, and ϕ4t, we can obtain a second-order difference equation for
ht that involves only the model parameters. To achieve this, first substitute equation
(144) into (147) to obtain
l˜∗t =
δ
Z¯
v¯γ
ucL¯L¯∗
(−αht + ρuht−1) , (148)
where
γ ≡
α
(1−α)2ucκθ¯
L¯∗2
v¯
λL∗ +
α
(1−α)2ucκθ¯
L¯∗2
v¯
∈ (0, 1) . (149)
By substituting equations (144), (145), and (148) into (83), we obtain
Etht+1 − k3ht − k4ht−1 = 0, (150)
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where
k3 ≡ α(1− α)ρ
2γ + (1− αργ) + βρ2u(1− ργ) + ζ(1 + β)
β [ρu(1− αργ) + ζ] , (151)
k4 ≡ −ρ
2γ(1− α)ρu + (1− ργ)ρu + ζ
β [ρu(1− αργ) + ζ] , (152)
and ζ is as defined by equation (127).
As discussed in Appendix D.1, the path of ht described by equation (150) is dynam-
ically stable if and only if |k3| < 1 − k4 and k4 > −1. Now, note that we can express
k3 + k4 − 1 in two ways as
k3 + k4 − 1
=
(1− βρu)(1− α) + (1− βρu)(α− ρu)(1− ργ) + ρ2γ(1− α)(α− ρu)
β [ρu(1− αργ) + ζ] (153)
=
(1− βρu)(1− ρu) + ργ(ρu − α)
[
(1− ρ)(1− β(1− q¯B)) + αρ]
β [ρu(1− αργ) + ζ] . (154)
Here, β, ρu, α, ρ, γ, and q¯
B all lie in (0, 1), and ζ > 0. Then, if α ≥ ρu, we have
k3 + k4 ≥ 1 as observed from equation (153), while if ρu > α, then k3 + k4 ≥ 1 as seen
from equation (154). The stability condition is therefore never satisfied, and thus the
same argument as in Appendix D.1 implies that under the optimal policy, ht = 0 for
all t. Therefore, equation (71) follows from equation (146). Further, ϕ4t = l˜
∗
t = 0 from
equations (145) and (148), which in turn implies ϕ3t = 0 from equation (147).
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